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THESE two important contributions to the literature on the loyalty and security
program appear at a time when the pendulum is swinging back from the emo-
tional excesses of the past decade. A bipartisan commission has begun a long
overdue assessment of the loyalty and security program among federal em-
ployees and defense workers.' The Supreme Court has agreed to review a
decision involving executive power to dismiss summarily on security grounds
federal employees holding nonsensitive, non-policy-making positions.2 A court
of appeals has ruled that the Coast Guard's port security regulations for
screening merchant seamen violate due process because opportunity is not
afforded for confrontation and cross-examination of informants and adverse
witnesses.3 The Attorney General has announced that he will recommend that
Congress abolish the mandatory requirement that an employee be suspended
before a hearing on security charges, and that the agency head be given dis-
cretion to permit the employee to remain at work pending the outcome of the
proceeding.4 The direction of the current is unmistakable.
Despite this trend, the issues raised by the administration of the loyalty and
security program will confront the country for years to come.5 The few signs
of light that have recently penetrated the fog of suspicion and fear have not
changed the program's basic institutions. The bureaucracy that administers the
program is deeply entrenched and will not be easily dislodged or readily re-
formed. The Civil Service Commission has revealed that it maintains a card
index file with the names of 2,000,000 persons "allegedly affiliated with some
sort of subversive organization or activity," and a "central security index" list-
ing 5,000,000 government personnel investigations dating back to 1939.6 The
vast number of dossiers in the possession of executive agencies and congres-
sional committees is, and will remain, a standing invitation to demagogy
and intimidation.
1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1955, p. 1, col. 5.
2. Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 900 (1955).
3. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1955, p. 8, col. 4.
5. For the historical background of the program, consult BoNrEcou, THE FEDmtAL
LOYALTY-SEcuRITY PROGRAM C. 1 (1953).
6. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
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John Lord O'Brian, one of the country's most distinguished lawyers, accu-
rately foresaw the evils of inquisitions into loyalty as early as 19 48. His
warning went unheeded. His latest volume consists of the two Godkin Lectures
on "The Essentials of Free Government and the Duties of the Citizen" which
he delivered at Harvard University in April 1955. He speaks in these lectures,
not as a prophet scorned, but as a man, fundamentally conservative, imbued
with humanistic ideals, who is deeply indignant at the violent departures from
standards of decency and fair play that the loyalty and security program has
brought with it. Mr. O'Brian's central thesis is that "the two wars, the desperate
experience of the great depression, and the threat of atomic warfare" have
strengthened an "all-pervasive craving for security at any price," and that
the resulting anxiety has evoked from the Executive and Congress a series
of drastic measures "having an appreciable effect upon the constitutional
guarantee of the right to think and to speak freely and equally important, the
right to criticize freely." 9 There has been established, he states, "something
like a new system of preventive law applicable to the field of ideas."'10 The basic
Anglo-Saxon legal principle that sanctions shall not be inflicted before an act
is committed has been abandoned, he observes, and men have been adjudged
untrustworthy "not because of wrongful acts, but because of motives attributed
to them, or because of suspicion as to their future conduct."" This new doctrine
is strikingly exemplified by the Internal Security Act of 1950, which authorizes
the President, acting through the Attorney General, to detain any person in
time of national emergency when "there is reasonable ground to believe that
such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to
engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage."'
2
Mr. O'Brian's sharpest criticism is reserved, however, for the "methods and
procedures adopted by the administrative agencies in carrying out these pro-
grams."' 3 He condemns the use of "secret information from anonymous in-
formants regarding whose reliability or competence even the hearing officers
have no information," the denial of the right of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation, and the use of agents provocateurs and paid informants.14 These prac-
tices, he observes, are draining the vitality from the presumption of innocence.
Mr. O'Brian is troubled by the indifference on the part of the general public
to these practices. He views with concern the public opinion study by Professor
Samuel Stouffer 15 which indicated widespread hostility to the exercise of First
Amendment rights. He has faith, however, that in time the "sense of fair
7. O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HA.v. L. REv. 592 (1948).
8. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDom 7.
9. Id. at 21.
10. Id. at 22.
11. Id. at 47.
12. 64 STAT. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1952).
13. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDom 32.
14. Id. at 36.
15. STOUFFER, COMM.sUNISM, CONFORMIT'Y AND CIVIL LmERTIEs (1955). See succeeding
review, 65 YALE L.J. 572 (1956).
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play," the "conscience," and the "moral tradition" of the American people
will be reasserted.' Mr. O'Brian writes in the intellectual tradition of Milton's
Areopagitica and John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty.
He sums up his critique of the loyalty and security program in these words:
"The gravest fault in the present system is not the attempt to provide
adequate security, but rather in the failure to appraise more accurately
the extent of the danger and then to test proposed measures of security
by the yardstick of long-established guarantees of the freedom of the
individual. The answer to the problem is not necessarily the abolition
of security programs, but a drastic revision by men soundly educated in
the history of freedom and in the history of constitutionalism."' 7
These are familiar themes. They are restated here with clarity and eloquence.
Case Studies in Personnel Security, prepared under the supervision of
Adam Yarmolinsky, furnishes abundant documentation for Mr. O'Brian's
charges. The Yarmolinsky volume consists of reports concerning fifty
loyalty and security cases involving government civilian employees, industrial
employees, military personnel, merchant seamen and employees of international
organizations. The study was financed by the Fund for the Republic. In an
introduction, Mr. Yarmolinsky indicates that this is a preliminary report and
that additional cases, about 250 in all, are presently being collected.
Each case is identified only by number. The employee's position is described,
particularly with reference to access to classified matter. The agency's charges
are set out, usually verbatim; the employee's response to the charges is sum-
marized; the hearing is described in some detail; and the outcome of the case
is given. The time involved in the proceeding and the time spent by counsel in
preparation and his fee are also noted. The materials were collected by lawyers,
with the consent of the employees involved, from the files of counsel who repre-
sented or advised the employees (the government files were not available to
the interviewers). Mr. Yarmolinsky does not assert that these cases are neces-
sarily representative, but attorneys familiar with the loyalty and security pro-
gram could attest that they are typical. In about half of the cases involving
civilian employees of the federal government reported by Mr. Yarmolinsky
the employee was cleared and reinstated. Authoritative figures are not available,
but there are indications that the percentage of individuals cleared after hearing
is greater than in these selected cases.
There is an unintended note of irony in the phrase "case studies" in the
title, for this collection of cases has no parallel in legal casebook literature.
The orthodox collection of cases consists in the main of opinions by courts or
administrative tribunals. One will search Mr. Yarmolinsky's collection of
cases in vain for a single statement by the authorities of the reasons why an
16. E.g., NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDom 82-83.
17. Id. at 46.
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individual has been adjudged disloyal or a security risk.ls The absence of a
corpus of freely accessible written opinions has profound implications. There
is no doctrine of stare decisis in the loyalty and security program. Different
employees similarly situated may be treated unequally and no one is the wiser.
Indeed, as the Ladejinsky case demonstrates, the same employee may be
treated differently by different agencies. The absence of published opinions
in these cases precludes the evolution of uniform and appropriate standards of
judgment. It has stymied the free play of informed professional criticism.
The persons immediately involved are denied one of the most fundamental rights
in any rational system of justice-an explanation by the adjudicating agency
of the reasons for its decision. 19 The absence of opinions has led to bewilder-
ment, bitterness and a pervasive feeling of injustice.20 Secrecy in government
has hitherto been regarded as abhorrent to our traditions. As Lord Acton
put it: "Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice;
nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity."- 1
Mr. Yarmolinsky's collection of cases is singular in another respect. A
collection of "Cases on Contracts" would be deemed curiously incomplete if
it did not mention such landmark cases as Hadley v. Baxendale or Falck v.
Williams. The Yarmolinsky collection eschews the great loyalty cases which
have stirred the nation-Oppenheimer, John Paton Davies, John Stewart
Service, Wolf Ladejinsky, Peters, Dorothy Bailey, Chasanow and Landy.
An illuminating commentary on the relation between state and individual in
our times could be written on the basis of these cases. But equally
instructive are the modest, unsensationalized cases of the sort that Mr. Yar-
molinsky has collected-such as those involving a journeyman carpenter, 22
an inspector of carcasses and meat products,23 a boiler fireman,24 a clerical
18. In authorizing agency heads to suspend and terminate the employment of indi-
viduals "when deemed necessary in the interest of national security," Congress provided
that before termination of his employment, the employee should be given "a written state-
ment of the decision of the agency head." 64 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952).
In Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the court of appeals held that a lettcr
from the agency head notifying the employee that "his employment had been ordered
terminated 'based on the study of all the documents in your case' " constituted a "decision."
Id. at 341. The court reasoned that there is a "difference between 'opinions' and 'de-
cisions'..... 'Opinions' state the reasons, and 'decisions' merely state the action taken."
Ibid. This illiberal construction blocked badly needed reform.
19. A committee of Parliament concluded in 1936 that the right of a party "to know
the reason for the decision" is a principle of "natural justice" from which administrative
agencies should not depart. Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, CMD. No. 4060,
at 75-80, quoted in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
n.17 (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
20. See Kaufman & Kaufman, Sonme Problems of Treatment Arising from the Fcdcral
Loyalty and Security Program, 25 Am. J. ORTHoPsYcHiATY 813 (1955).
21. Nichols, Lord Acton, 1 U14v1sIv OBSERVER 10, 14 (1947).
22. Case No. 105, CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURrTY 128.
23. Case No. 136, id. at 158.
24. Case No. 146, id. at 177.
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employee 2 -which dramatize the grotesque extension of the security pro-
gram to areas that do not have the remotest connection with any rational con-
ception of the national safety.2 8
The cases collected here show clearly the extent to which the loyalty and
security program has disregarded the wisdom of experience accumulated over
the centuries with respect to the proper standards for reaching just results:
(1) There is no doctrine of double jeopardy. An employee may be retried
repeatedly on the same charges. In one case reported by Mr. Yarmolinsky
an employee was required to answer charges in 1948; the same charges in 1952;
and the identical charges in 1954.27
(2) There is no statute of limitations, nor any recognition of the concept
of fairncss underlying the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
In one case reported here the inquiry reached back to activities of the employee
in 1931. 2 Typical of the charges is this one: "That about 1937-38 in or
around [city & state], you actively participated in collecting funds for purchase
of an ambulance for the use of the Loyalist Army in the Spanish Civil War."'2 9
As these cases show, the activities and associations of a lifetime are deemed
to be legitimate areas of inquiry.
(3) There are no standards of relevancy or competence. Since the charges
are vague and the criteria of judgment are ill-defined, there are no bounds to the
inquiry in loyalty and security hearings. In one case reported by Mr. Yarmo-
linsky, an employee was asked by board counsel: "What do you think of female
chastity ?"-" My favorite example of this sort of thing from Yarmolinsky's
collection involves the employee who was "asked rather sharply why the fact
that her fathcr-in-law took so long to get dressed was something funny ...
Approximately twenty minutes [of the hearing] were taken up with questions
relating to the fact that her father-in-law took a long time to get dressed." 3'
(4) The right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers is denied. As
Mr. Yarmolinsky's cases show, a loyalty "hearing" usually consists of the
testimony of the employee and the witnesses summoned by him in his behalf.
The government virtually never produces any witnesses to substantiate the
charges. The informant appeared in only one of the cases involving federal
employees reported by Mr. Yarmolinsky, and he finally admitted that if he
saw the accused employee "come up in the street I don't know who he is,
even."' 32 Denied confrontation, the employee is limited in many cases to an
25. Case No. 37, id. at 38.
26. See Shils, Security and Science Sacrificed to Loyalty, 11 BULL. ATou. SCIENTISTS
106 (1955).
27. Case No. 51, CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURITY 60.
28. Case No. 53, id. at 74.
29. Case No. 18, id. at 21. Compare the hostility of the judiciary to "archeological
ec.-:avations" in anti-trust cases. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326 (1952).
30. Case No. 10, CAsE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURITY 12.
31. Case No. 55, id. at 80.
32. Case No. 51, id. at 68.
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affirmative statement of his loyalty. The accused employee must assume the
burden of proving that he is not disloyal.
One factor generally overlooked in discussion of the administration of the
loyalty and security program-the lapse of time between the charges and final
disposition, and between the hearing and notification to the employee-is
highlighted by the reports of these cases. In one case the proceeding from
the time of service of interrogatories to the date of the final ruling consumed
about two years and five months.33 In another case an employee was not
notified of the decision until eight months after the hearing.34 Delays of this
character inevitably intimidate and exhaust the employee.
Mr. Yarmolinsky's collection reflects admirable craftsmanship. The text
is lucid. The pertinent materials are well organized. This is an important
volume for anyone concerned with loyalty and security problems.
The question must inevitably occur to any reader of these two volumes,
"In what direction should the country now turn ?" Ir. Yarmolinsky's work is
purely descriptive; he makes no policy recommendations. Mr. O'Brian would
"strictly .. . confine the operation of these programs to specific points or
specific areas which in good faith can be denominated as sensitive."O The
British, for instance, have limited their security program to persons whose
work is vital to the security of the state; only about 20,000 individuals are
affected.3 6
Mr. O'Brian also would insist that no individual be branded as disloyal or a
security risk without an opportunity to confront and cross-examine his ac-
cusers.37 The probability that this reform will be made seems slight. The denial
of confrontation is now a matter of settled executive policy.38 The Supreme Court
has twice been asked to decide that denial of confrontation is a denial of due
process, but in the Bailey case 39 the Court divided four-to-four, and in Peters v.
Hobby 40 it side-stepped the issue and rested its judgment on procedural grounds
that will have little significance as precedent. If Mr. O'Brian's suggestion were
adopted, it would probably temper some of the harshness of the loyalty and
33. Case No. 10, id. at 13.
34. Case No. 88, id. at 124.
35. NATIONAL SECMUITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOm 63.
36. BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcuRiTY PRoGRAM 263 (1953). As of June
30, 1953, the FBI had processed 4,772,278 loyalty or security forms since 1947, and had
made 27,326 full field investigations and 27,200 preliminary investigations during that same
period. ANNUAL REPoRr OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 21-22 (1953).
37. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDom 74.
38. The policy of the executive department has been authoritatively summed up as
follows: "National security demands that certain types of information be kept confidential
and that the employee be denied confrontation and cross examination of confidential in-
formants." Brief for Respondents, p. 24, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
39. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1950).
40. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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security program. But the Oppenheimer case indicates the limitations of the
proposal. Oppenheimer was tried on evidence that was disclosed to him. He
was permitted to confront and cross-examine his accusers. Yet many thought-
ful persons are convinced that the result in that case was unjust, and there is
no doubt that the proceeding did incalculable damage to the morale of the scien-
tific community and to America's good name throughout the world.
The pith of the matter, as Thurman Arnold has pointed out, is that the
loyalty and security hearings are character trials, and a trial or hearing is not
a suitable instrument in a democracy for passing upon a man's character.41
The cases gathered by Mr. Yarmolinsky show that a loyalty hearing involves
a judgment of a man's beliefs and associations throughout his lifetime. The
Oppenheimer case demonstrates the impossibility of satisfactorily evaluating
such intangibles even when the procedure is consistent with traditional standards
and the judges are honorable and conscientious. In short, the nature of the
subject is such that it may be impossible to devise any fair trial or hearing
procedure.
In the light of events of the past decade, no prudent person can gainsay
the real and persistent danger of espionage, or the genuine need for appropriate
precautions. But spies and saboteurs will not be detected by the clumsy appa-
ratus of the loyalty and security program. Of course persons lacking fidelity
and discretion should not be allowed to occupy positions vital to the security
of the country. But screening out such persons involves judgments as to com-
petence, the kind of decisions made every day by employers and principals.
No great corporation would undertake to ascertain the trustworthi-
ness of its employees by a trial process.42 Investigation and judgments as to
these matters can be made without the trappings of a quasi-judicial inquiry.
In any event, it would seem better to have no hearing than the kind of hear-
ings described in Mr. Yarmolinsky's collected cases. The loyalty and security
hearing offers the community the illusion of a result arrived at by an inde-
pendent and informed deliberative body which has weighed the evidence and
afforded the employee his day in court.43 The stigma of a discharge in such
cases is greater than in a case involving summary dismissal, for the reason that
the employee will be understood to have been dismissed, not arbitrarily, but
after what appears to be a quasi-judicial hearing. The use of a hearing has
significant political implications and deep psychological roots. It enables the
Executive to appear just and righteous. It cloaks the proceedings in a mantle
of fairness. Public criticism is deflected; the community's misgivings are
quieted. Psychologically, a quasi-judicial hearing enables those responsible for
the program to relieve the guilt and anxiety aroused by the "dirty business" in
which they are engaged. They can comfort themselves with the fantasy that
they are observing the ritual prescribed by the community for determining
41. Arnold, Due Process in Trials, 300 AxNALs 123 (1955).
42. Cf. BERuFj THE 20TH CEN=uY CAPITALIST REvOLuTION 91 (1954).
43. See Fortas, Outside the Law, 192 ATANTic 42, 44 (1953).
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who is innocent and who shall be punished. Perhaps these same factors under-
lie the purge "trials" in totalitarian states.
If, as Mr. O'Brian suggests, we are suffering from a mass neurosis, the
appropriate therapy, as in the treatment of an individual's neuroses, is one
calculated to produce a realistic understanding of the problem. In an individual,
a concern for security that is disproportionate to any actual danger is a symp-
tom of emotional illness. The individual whose energy is bound up in defense's
against fancied threats is handicapped in effectively mobilizing his psychic
energy against the problems of the real world. The drive for security tends
to produce greater insecurity. The loyalty and security program is based upon
a far-reaching misconception of the danger to the national safety. The threat
does not arise from the eccentric, the unorthodox or the dissenter. Yet such
individuals are the subjects of the cases reported by Mr. Yarmolinsky. Because
the loyalty and security program is misdirected, it has tended to heighten inse-
curity. Enormous sums of money and the brain-power of countless individuals
have been invested for a return that is negligible in terms of the nationad
safety. The value of an effective counter-intelligence corps would far exceed
that of the much publicized, highly politicized loyalty and security program.
An essential prelude to any reform of the program is an accurate and objective
description of the true magnitude of the danger of treason, espionage, sabotage
and subversion. As Mr. O'Brian puts it, we need "to appraise more accurately
the extent of the danger." 44 Steps appropriate to meeting these hazards can
then be taken. In 1948, Mr. O'Brian pointed out that if we are going to investi-
gate men's beliefs and associations, "we must pay the price for it." "Are we
prepared to do this ?" he asked. "And is the result worth while?" 5 These
questions, which strike at the heart of the matter, are as pertinent today as they
were eight years ago.
ABE KRASHt
COIIMUNISM, CONFORIMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THY,
NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND. By Samuel A. Stouffer. Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1955. Pp. 278. $4.00.
THIS is a detailed report on a sociological survey of attitudes tow\ard civil
liberties done in the summer of 1954 under the auspices of the Fund for the
Republic. Although the major findings of the survey have been widely pub-
licized, perhaps there is still room for discussion of some of their implications
for lawyers and legal theorists.
If the study is accurate, a sizable proportion of the American public are in
favor of sharply curtailing the civil liberties of Communists and other "radi-
cals." More than half of the interviewees in a representative national sample
44. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREED0_o 46.
45. O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARv. L. Rcv. 592, 609 (194. ).
-Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
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